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THE USE AT REVOCATION OF CONDITIONAL

LIBERTY HEARINGS OF

SUPPRESSION HEARING ADMISSIONS: AN EROSION OF "THE EFFICACY
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE"

Edward G. Mascolo*

I. INTRODUCTION
The function of the exclusionary rule is to secure to the
individual the protection of the fourth amendment1 against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 To implement this function,
one accused of a crime is accorded an opportunity to move for the
suppression in a criminal trial of the fruits of an illegal search or
seizure. The admissibility of these fruits, however, can be blocked
4
only upon "timely objection," '3 which usually means before trial;
for if the movant's claim is not timely pressed, he will be deemed in
5
the usual course of events to have waived his right to complain.
This right to complain implicates privacy interests, for one
who protests an unreasonable search or seizure must assert, and
establish, a personal interest in the place or areas searched, or in
the evidence seized, that is sufficient to satisfy a legitimate and
societally recognized expectation of privacy from unreasonable
* Member of the Connecticuit and District of Colmbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief of the
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973, and currently member of Editorial Board; B. A., Wesleyan
University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown University, 1952; cturrently research consultant to Office of
Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of Connecticut. The opinions expressed herein are
those only of the author.
1. "The right of the people, to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
2. Rakas v. Illinois, - U. S. -, -, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
482 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377, 389 (1968).
3. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) (emphasis added).
4. See, e. g., FEo. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) (3), 41 (f);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §54-33f(1969).
5. United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f0.
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governmental intrusion into the invaded place o' areas. 6 Such
assertion will usually involve some property or possessory interest,
or some other legitimate expectation-of-privacy interest, either in
the place or areas searched or in the evidence seized. 7 Thus, to
protect a legitimate expectation of privacy under the fourth
amendment, a search victim is permitted to exclude; to exclude, he
must establish the requisite privacy interest; and to establish such
interest, he may expose himself to potential incrimination in
another tribunal or forum.
The focus of this study will be on the prosecution's use of the
pre-trial suppression hearing testimony of an accused, rendered by
him to establish the privacy interest necessary to assert a fourth
amendment right, in particular, the use of this testimony to revoke
the conditional liberty of an accused on deferred sentence, probation, or parole for a prior offense, with special emphasis on the effect of such use upon the continued efficacy of the exclusionary
rule.
II. SIMMONS V. UNITED STATES
In Simmons v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court came to grips
with this issue and held that suppression hearing testimony by an
accused may not thereafter be used against him at trial on the issue
of guilt. 9 The Court reasoned that the potential use of such
testimony at trial would act as a deterrent to some accused wishing
to present the testimonial proof of standing required to assert a
claim under the fourth amendment. 1 0 Moreover, the knowledge of
subsequent use would act as a strong deterrent "in those marginal
cases in which it [could not] be estimated with confidence whether
the motion [would] succeed."' Thus, to permit such use created
an unacceptable risk of deterring the assertion of marginal fourth
amendment claims, thereby "weakening the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a sanction for unlawful police behavior." 1 2
Although "fthis was surely an analytically sufficient basisfor decision, "3 the Court in Simmons went on to observe that the condition
6. Rakas v. Illinois, - U. S. -, -,99 S. Ct. 421, 429, 430 &n.12, 433 (1978), and id. at-,
99 S. Ct. at. 434-36 (Powell,J., concurring).
7. See id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 430 &n.12, 433, and id. at 435-36 (Powell, J., concurring).
8. 390 U. S. 377 (1968).
9. Id. at 394. However, if an accused, as a witness and not as a party, voluntarily testifies in a
trial of another defendant in support of a motion to suppress, his testimony will be admissible in his
own subsequent prosecution. United States v. Cecil, 457 F.2d 1178, 1181 (8th Cir. 1972).
10. 390 U. S. at 392-93.
11.Id. at 393.
12. McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 211 (1971) (interpreting the holding in Simmons).
13. Id.(emphasis added).
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thus imposed on the good-faith assertion of fourth amendment
rights was "of a kind to which this Court has always been
peculiarly sensitive,"' 4 for it posed the risk that the accused would
incriminate himself through the later use of his testimony. 5 While
acknowledging "[als an abstract matter" that the testimony might
be voluntary, and that testimony to secure a benefit is not per se6
compelled within the meaning of the self-incrimination clause,'
because one may refuse to testify and thereby forego the benefit,
the Court nevertheless distinguished the situation in Simmons
because "the 'benefit' to be gained is that afforded by another
provision of the Bill of Rights. .....

"17

In this setting, "an

undeniable tension is created. Thus, in this case Garrett [the
accused] was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advise
of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal
effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. In these circumstances," concluded the Court, "we
find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another."I 8
Although the efficacy of the exclusionary rule rationale in Simmons remains intact, there is some doubt as to the validity of its selfincrimination analysis. In McGautha v. California,19 the defendant
was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death by a
jury that had determined the issues of guilt and punishment in a
unitary trial. He argued that he was deprived of his due process
right of allocution because the unitary trial procedures forced him
to forego his right to address his sentencer in order to invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, he reasoned, this
created a tension between constitutionally protected rights similar
to that proscribed by the Court in Simmons.
In rejecting this argument, 20 the Court observed that "[wihile
we have no occasion to question the soundness of the result in Simmons
14. 390 U.-S. at 393.
15. Id.
16. U. S. Co NsT. amend. V states, "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself..
17. 390 U. S. at 394.
18. Id. However, where such surrender is neither compelled nor required, the testimony will be
admissible. United States v. Dohm, 597 F.2d 535, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1979) (sanctioning trial use of
bail hearing testimony) (2-1 decision).
19. 402 U. S. 183(1971).
20. Since the self-incrimination analysis in McGautha is beyond the purview of this study, the
rationale of the Court's holding will not be discussed at length. For further comment on McGautha, see
Note, Revocation of ConditionalLiberty for the Commission ofa Crime: DoubleJeopardyand Self-Incrimination
Limitations, 74 MIcu. L. REv. 525, 543-45 (1976), which conchldes that "[tlhe authority of
McGautha... seems to have been vitiated", Id. at 545; see People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 50708, 272 N.W.2d 699, 704 (1978), by the Supreme Cmrt's decision in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S.
605, 609, 610-12 (1972) (self-incrimination clause prohibits a state from regulating the timing, or
order, of a defendant's testimony, or from denying the right to give such testimony if a defendant
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and do not do so, to the extent that its rationale was based on a 'tension' between constitutional rights and the policies behind them,
the validity of that reasoning must now be regarded as open to
question ....
",21 However, the Court implicitly emphasized that
22
the holding in Simmons "really rested on the fourth amendment,"
for it characterized the purely fifth amendment interest implicated
in Simmons as insubstantial. 3 Moreover, it noted that the accused
in Simmons did not have a strong claim "to be relieved of his illadvised 'waiver' [of the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination] ....
",24 It is thus seen that the fourth amendment
basis and rationale for Simmons have not been impaired by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, and may be invoked for
protection against any "weakening [of the] efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a sanction for unlawful police behavior."25

III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE USE OF SUCH ADMISSIONS
While there does not appear to be any reported decision directly on point, a compelling argument against the use of such admissions can be made on the basis of existing precedents.
Since the Weeks 26 decision in 1914, the exclusionary rule has
demonstrated its efficacy for enforcing fundamental rights secured
to the individual by the fourth amendment. 27 The vehicle for giving
does not comply with the requirements oftiming), discussed in Note, supra, 74 MICH. L. REV. at 545.
See generally New Jersey v. Portash, 99 S. Ct. 1292, 1295 (1979) (implicitly recognizing, in citing to
Brooks, that a judicial ruling sanctioning the impeachment uise at trial of immunized grand jury
testimony effectively penalized the accused by causing him to forego testifying in order to preserve
his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination). It has also been suggested that Simmons is
sufficiently distinguishable from McGautha to retain its precedential vitality. Note, Resolving Tensions
Between ConstitutionalRights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 674,
708-12 (1976). McGautha has been interpreted as impliedly holding that Simmons should have been
decided on the basis of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over trials in federal courts rather
than the requirements of the Constitution. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 881, 533 P.2d 1024,
1036-37, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 396-97 (1975) (en banc). This misconceives the McGautha emphasis
ipon the fact that Simmons rested on fourth amendment, as well as fifth amendment, grounds. "It
seems obvious that a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissible against him at trial
will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testimonial proof of standing necessary to assert a
Fourth Amendment claim." 390 U. S. at 392-93. See 402 U. S. at 212; 390 U. S. at 393; Note,
Revocation of Conditional Liberty for the Commission of a Crime: Double Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination
Limitations, 74 MICH. L. REV. 525, 544 n.91 (1976). Furthermore, Simmons has been interpreted as
protecting fourth amendment rights. See, e. g., State v. Wright, 266 Ore. 163, 168 n.2, 511 P.2d
1223, 1225 n.2 (1973).
21. 402 U. S. at 212-13 (emphasis added).
22. Note, Revocation of ConditionalLiberty for the Commission of a Crime: Double Jeopardy and SelfIncriminationLimitations, 74 MICH. L. REV. 525, 544 n.91 (1976).
23. 402 U. S. at 212.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 211.
26. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), (the Court's first enunciation of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule). United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 443 (1976).
27. "[Tihe rule is. . . designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights," United States v.
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impetus to the exclusionary rule is a procedural device28 known as
the motion to suppress. However, before a victim of an alleged
illegal search or seizure will be heard to complain, he must assert,
and establish, a sufficient privacy interest under the fourth
amendment. Traditionally, this interest has been referred to as

"standing."

29

More recently, it has been characterized as the

"substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine."

30

With the advent of the stricter requirements for standing

announced recently in Rakasv. Illinois,3t a movant for suppression
carried a heavy burden of persuasion to qualify as an aggrieved
person under the amendment. This means that he will be required
to prove that he possesses a personal interest either in the locus of
the search or in the evidence seized. 32 Such proof will usually involve, if not actually require, some property or possessory interest,
or some other legitimate expectation-of-privacy interest. 33 To this
end, it may prove necessary, on occasion, that he take the stand at a

suppression hearing and admit ownership of, or some other
possessory interest in, the evidence seized. 34 In this setting, his
testimony will be regarded "as an integral part of his Fourth

Amendment exclusion claim."35 Moreover, "[t]estimony of this
kind, which links a defendant to evidence which the Government
considers important enough to seize and to seek to have admitted at
trial, must often be highly prejudicialto a defendant. "36

This prejudice has been heightened by the privacy interest
standards mandated by Rakas, because they will necessitate a certain exposure to punitive action against the defendant in another

tribunal. For example, in Rakas itself, petitioners asserted neither a
property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched, nor
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974), and "is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments ...." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S.643, 657 (1961).
28. See Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 260, 264 (1960); Edwards, Standing to Suppress
UnreasonablySeized Evidence, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 471, 471-72 (1952).
29. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389-91 (1968).
30. Rakas v. Illinois, -, U. S. -, -, 99 S. Ct. 421, 428 (1978) (emphasizing and endorsing the
"[rigorous application of the principal that the rights secured by [the Fourth] Amendment are
personal, in place ofa notion of'standing' ").
31. - U. S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
32. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 429, 430 en.12, 433, and id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 434-36 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, such proof will require more than either a casual interest or presence, and
a mere legitimate presence, with the consent of the owner or of one having the lawful right to confer
such presence, will not be controlling of the legitimacy of one's expectation of privacy, the resolution
of which will require an ad hoc analysis of all the surrounding circumstances, and not simply the fact
that the movant was the "target" of the search. Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 426-28, 429-30 &n. 12, 432-33,
and id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 435, 436 (Powell, J., concurring), qualifying, and implicitly overruling in
part,Jonesv. UnitedStates, 362 U. S. 257, 261, 267 (1960).
33. See id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 430 & n. 12, 433, and id. at 435-36 (Powell, J., concurring).
34. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 390-91 (1968).
35. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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an interest in the sawed-off rifle and rifle shells seized. Consequently, they lacked any legitimate expectation of privacy as mere
passengers in the areas of the car from which the evidence was
seized. 37 This denial of interest in the items seized precluded
exposure to detrimental action elsewhere, but at the expense of
prosecuting to detrimental action elsewhere, but at the expense of
prosecuting fourth amendment claims. Conversely, if petitioners in
Rakas had satisfied the privacy interest standards, then their
testimony would have exposed them to prejudicial consequences
beyond the immediate criminal prosecution. In either event, the
effect would be to deter the prosecution of marginal claims under
the fourth amendment, "thus weakening the efficacy of the
exclusionary rule.... ')38
These consequences are "most extreme in prosecutions'' 3 9 to
revoke the conditional liberty of persons on deferred sentence,
probation, or parole, for virtually any suppression hearing
admission of a privacy interest in the objects of a search or seizure
will almost surely- trigger a certain exposure to punitive action
against a defendant at large on conditional liberty for a prior
offense. 46 This exposure, and resultant chilling effect, can be
particularly severe where the movant for suppression is confronted
with the claim that since conditional liberty revocation "is not a
3

37. - U. S. at -, 99S. Ct. at 43 .
38. McGaotha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 211 (1971); Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S.
377, 392-93 (1968).
39. Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 391 (1969).
40. For example, in Rakas the objects seized were a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells, which hail
been seized by the police choring a search of an auitomobile in which petitioners had been traveling as
passengers, and which were offered into evidence at their trial by the prosectihon. - U. S. at -, 99
S. Ct. at 423.
Proceedings to revoke conditional liberty on the basis of sippression hearing admissiins made
to prosecute foirth amendment claims implicate constitotional issois that are analogis to, btil
legally distinct from, the fifth amendment issues of self-incrimination and dItible jeopardy involved
in revocation proceedings initiated in response to the commission of a crime. See generally Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-77 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U_ S. 391, 400-1, 407-9 (1976)
(the fmirth and fifth amendments protect separate privacy interests); Cotch v. United States, 401)9
U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (same); McGaitha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211-13 (1971); Mascolo,
The Use at Trial of Suppression Hearing Admissions. An Ersion of the PrivileeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 72
DicK. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1967). For disctssion of these latter isses, see Note, Revocation of(Conditional
Liberty for the Commission ofa Crime: Double Jeopardy andSelf-Incrimination Limitations, 74 Mii.
L. R Ev.
525 (1976). However, this is not to imply that certain activity may not violate both amendments. See
generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n.l1(1976) (by implication)- For analysis of the
isstes implicated by the tse of a defendant's revocation hearing testimony at his sutbseq~ient trial on
the inderlying charge, see People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3td 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384
(1975) (en bane); People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978). For discission tfthe
admissibility of illegally seized evidence in probation revocation proceedings, see Annot., 30 A. L.
R. FEJm.824 (1976) (federal proceedings); Annot., 77 A.I.R. 3d 636 (1977) (state proceedings); and
for the admissibility in sich proceedings of a statement obtained in violation of the Miranda Rile
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) ), see Anntt., 30 A.1..R. FED. 824 (1976) (federal
proceedings); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 3d 669 (1977) (state proceedings).
The issies raised in this stidy are not to be confused with the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rile, which has as its "primary ,tstification .. the deterrence ofpolice conduict that
violates Fcirth Amendment rights," Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976) (emphasis added).
What is implicated here is the deterrence posed by prosecitive conduct to the very invocation itse/fof
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stage of a criminal prosecution," ' 4 1 so that "the full panoply of
rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to...
revocations, "42 the procedures required to vindicate rights secured
under the fourth amendment are irrelevant to revocation
proceedings.
Although there is a certain facile logic in this approach, it will
not withstand close examination. In the first place, it ignores the
fact that conditional liberty revocation "does result in a loss of
liberty," ' 43 and, accordingly, the requirements of due process in
general apply to such proceedings. 4 4 Since termination of conditional liberty "inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the [individual] and often
on others, '' 4 5 due process ensures a "guarantee of fundamental
fairness" 46 so as to protect "the individual against arbitrary action.
. . .,
Surely, it will do violence to this concept of "fairness" to
deter a search victim from speaking up in defense of his fourth
amendment right of privacy by using such testimony to revoke his
liberty. 48 In such a setting, the "irrelevance" will become painfully
relevant.
Furthermore, it is not relevant to argue that admissibility
should be permitted onthe basis of the relaxed rules of evidence permitted at revocation hearings. 49 We are not primarily concerned
here with the quality of evidence, which, concededly, is trustworthy. Rather, our concern is with the deterrent effect of such admissibility upon the vindication of fourth amendment rights in an
adversary criminal proceeding.
More fundamentally, revocation use of suppression hearing
testimony would severely weaken the efficacy of the exclusionary
rule in the very type of situation that most concerned the Supreme
Court in Simmons: "the prosecution of marginal Fourth Amendment
claims." 50 In short, such use would surely create "an unacceptable
the exchtsionary rtle in a criminal prosecution. Moreover, although I continue to adhere to the
position, previouisly expressed, that the subsequent tuse ofsuppression hearing testimony on the issue
of guilt or innocence is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, Mascolo, The Use at
Trial of Suppression HearingAdmissions: An Erosion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 72 Dick. L.
REV. 1,28-33 (1967), a view endorsed in Simmons, 390 U. S. at 393-94, United States v. Kahan, 415
U. S. 239, 242 (1974) (per curiam), that thesis lies beyond the pale of this study, which is concerned
solely with the deterrent effect ofsuich use upon the prosecution of fouirth amendment claims.
41. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
42. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). For example, the exclusionary rule is not
- (La. 1979).
So.2d __,
ordinarily applicable to revocation proceedings. State v. Davis, __
However, this restriction is limited to the suppression of illegally seized evidence, and is irrelevant to
revocation use of suppression hearing testimony.
43. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (footnote omitted).
44. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
45. Id.
46. Taylor v. Kentuicky, 436 U.S. 478, 487 n. 15, (1978).
47. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pblic Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937)(Cardozo,J.).
48. See generally Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972).
49. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
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risk of deterring" 51 the vindication of fourth amendment rights. Indeed, it would be a bitter irony if the movant succeeded in prosecuting his fourth amendment claim, thereby leading to a
dismissal of the criminal charges pending against him, only to have
his conditional liberty revoked primarily on the basis of his suppression hearing testimony that was presented solely to obtain a benefit
to which he was constitutionally entitled. And, it would be equally
bitter if such vindication exposed him to a more severe sentence in
the revocation proceedings than could have been imposed in the
criminal case had suppression been denied. However, this
Hobson's-choice dilemma would not end here, for if he refrained
from prosecuting the fourth amendment claim, he would increase
the risk of conviction, thereby increasing his exposure to revocation, which he originally sought to avoid by abstaining from exclusion. Criminal proceedings are so fraught with variables that
such an eventuality may not be discounted. Furthermore, revocation use should not be made to hinge on the outcome of the motion
to suppress, because the deterrent effect of such use attaches prior to
the ruling on the motion. For example, if the case against the accused is a weak one, he may decide that it is preferable to forego the
prosecution of a marginal fourth amendment claim than it is to
render suppression hearing testimony that may prove to be most
damaging to him in revocation proceedings. Therefore, the suppression hearing testimony of an accused should not thereafter be
admitted against him on the issue of guilt 52 at a hearing on the
revocation of his conditional liberty, "unless he makes no objection. ''51
IV. CONCLUSION
Simmons v. United States stands as an immutable barrier to the
use, on the issue of guilt, of a defendant's suppression hearing
testimony, rendered in prosecution of a fourth amendment claim,
in a subsequent hearing to revoke his conditional liberty. It would
be an empty victory indeed to allow a defendant to successfully vindicate his constitutional rights only at the eventual cost
50. McGauitha v. California, 402 U S. 183, 211 (1971) (emphasis added); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1968).
51. McGauthav. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211 (1971).
52. It will be available, of course, for impeachment or rebuttal puirposes on matters collateral to
the issue of guilt. 1'Valder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954); seeSimmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). And, if he is convicted in the criminal trial, that fact will also be
admissible.
53. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
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of his liberty. This result could only act as a severe deterrent to any
person at large on conditional liberty who seeks to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule, in particular, to "the prosecution
of marginal Fourth Amendment claims. ... ,,54 Such a "pernicious
doctrine ' 55 would reduce the fourth amendment "to a form of,
words," ' 56 and, accordingly, should be resolutely rejected by the
Courts. Finally, collateral use of suppression hearing testimony in
revocation hearings would do violence also to the concept of
"fundamental fairness" under the due process clause of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.

54. McGauthav. California, 402 U.S. 183, 211 (1971).
55. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
56. Silverthorne Lomber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, .1.).

